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principal payments on installment note; not engaged in
trade or business); Est. of Sussman v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1978-344 (retired CPA who earned no income as
accountant no longer engaged in trade or business).
11 Jones v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1988-393 (full time
auditor at college not engaged in trade or business of
gambling even though substantial activity involved).  See
Rev. Rul. 58-112, 1958-1 C.B. 323 (corporate officer
who negotiated sale of corporate stock not in trade or
business).
12 Commissioner v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23 (1987)
("constant and large-scale effort" by taxpayer in
gambling activity was trade or business).
13 I.R.C. § 1402(b).
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ANIMALS
HORSES-ALM § 1.01[2].* The plaintiff’s decedent was
killed when the decedent’s car struck the defendant’s horse
on a highway. The horse had been confined by a low fence
and the defendant testified that the gate to the pasture was
found open after the accident. The trial court granted
summary judgment to the defendant because the plaintiff
had failed to provide evidence of the defendant’s negligence
in fencing in the horse. The appellate court reversed,
holding that Miss. Code § 69-13-111 provides a
presumption that the owner of an escaped animal was
presumed to have been negligent and required the owner to
prove lack of negligence. Carpenter v. Nobile, 620 So.2d
961 (Miss. 1993).
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   
    DISCHARGE-ALM § 13.03[6].* An insurance company
hired the debtor to recover and sell a stolen tractor found by
the police. The debtor made the highest bid and retained the
tractor but failed to make any payment to the company. The
debtor sold the tractor without paying the company and the
company obtained a default judgment for the price of the
tractor plus punitive damages. The company claimed that
the judgment was nondischargeable, arguing that the
Bankruptcy Court must give the default judgment issue
preclusion as to the debtor’s willful and malicious injury of
the company’s property. The court held that a default
judgment may not be accorded either claim or issue
preclusion in a subsequent bankruptcy proceeding.
However, the court held that the facts of the case
demonstrated the debtor’s willful and malicious injury of
the company's property and denied the debtor’s discharge of
the judgment, including the punitive damages. In re Hale,
155 B.R. 730 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1993).
EXEMPTIONS-ALM § 13.03[3].*
AUTOMOBILE. The debtor claimed the $2,000
exemption, under Va. Code § 34-26(8), for a vehicle which
was collateral for a nonpurchase money loan. The trustee
obtained an avoidance of the lien against the vehicle and
sold the vehicle at an auction. The trustee argued that in
avoiding the lien, the trustee became the lien holder and was
entitled to the proceeds of the sale of the vehicle before the
debtor could claim any exemption. The court held that under
Va. Code § 34-26, nonpurchase liens against exempt
property were void; therefore, because the lien was never
effective against the exemption, the trustee’s lien status was
junior to the exemption. The court also held that the debtor’s
exemption carried over to the proceeds of the vehicle. In re
Fenessy, 156 B.R. 22 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1993).
AVOIDABLE LIENS. A creditor obtained a judgment
against the debtors in 1989 and recorded the judgment lien.
At the time the judgment lien attached, the debtor’s property
was rented to third parties. The debtors moved into the
property in 1992 and filed for bankruptcy in 1993. The
debtors claimed the California automatic homestead
exemption available in 1993 for $100,000 for residents over
the age of 55 and income of less than $20,000.  The creditor
objected to the exemption, arguing that the exemption
should be determined as of the date the judgment lien
attached in 1989 when the property was not used as a
residence. The court held that the debtors could create a
homestead exemption by moving into the property pre-
petition but that the lien was avoidable only to the extent of
the homestead exemption available to the debtors at the time
the lien attached to the property. In re Mayer, 156 B.R. 54
(Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1993).
HOMESTEAD. The debtor’s mortgagee obtained a
foreclosure of the mortgage against the debtors’ residence.
The debtors filed suit to invalidate the sale of the residence.
Prior to filing for bankruptcy, the debtors had entered into a
settlement with the mortgage holder to allow the debtors
time to attempt to sell the residence. Before the time
expired, the debtors filed for bankruptcy and the trustee
renegotiated the settlement agreement and eventually sold
the residence. The debtors filed an exemption for the
residence. The trustee objected to the exemption, arguing
that the foreclosure eliminated the debtors’ interest in the
residence such that on the petition date, the debtors had no
interest in the residence for which an exemption was
allowed. The court held that because the validity of the
foreclosure was never finally litigated, the debtors had a
possible interest in the residence sufficient to claim the
residence as a homestead exemption. The trustee also
argued that because the sale was made post-petition, the
debtor could not claim the exemption in the proceeds. The
court held that the debtors’ exemption continued in the
proceeds of the residence, whether sold pre- or post-petition.
In re Donaldson, 156 B.R. 51 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1993).
The debtors had been residents of Wisconsin where the
husband was a part owner of a small business for which the
debtor had guaranteed several business loans. When the
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business began to fail, the husband sold his interest in the
business and the debtors sold their residence and moved to
Florida. The debtors purchased a new residence using all of
the proceeds of the previous residence and used all of their
other non-exempt assets for living expenses until the
husband found employment. The debtors admitted that the
move to Florida was made to take advantage of the more
liberal exemptions, especially the full exemption for
homesteads. The debtors filed for bankruptcy one year and
five days after moving to Florida and the holder of the
guaranteed loan objected to the homestead exemption as
impermissable pre-bankruptcy conversion of assets. The
court held that the conversion of non-exempt assets and the
move to Florida were impermissable pre-bankruptcy
planning with the intent to evade creditors and the court
reduced the homestead exemption to the amount allowed
under Wisconsin law. In re Coplan, 156 B.R. 88 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1993).
OBJECTIONS TO EXEMPTIONS. A law firm obtained
a judgment against the debtor. The judgment lien attached to
a divorce decree payment to the debtor from the debtor’s ex-
spouse. The payment was found to have been made in
compensation for the debtor’s relinquishment of rights in
the marital residence. The debtor claimed the divorce decree
payment as a homestead exemption and the trustee sought to
avoid the law firm’s lien as impairing the exemption. The
law firm had not objected to the homestead exemption
within the time limit and the debtor argued that the law firm
was barred from objecting to the exemption. The court held
that because secured creditors are not required to file claims
or otherwise participate in the bankruptcy proceedings until
forced by actions such as an avoidance or other challenge to
the secured status of the claim, the law firm could challenge
the exemption. The court held that the exemption was
allowed since the divorce decree payment was in exchange
for the loss of rights in the marital homestead; therefore, the
judgment lien could be avoided. In re Maylin, 155 B.R.
605 (Bankr. D. Me. 1993).
SALE OF EXEMPT PROPERTY. The debtor owned a
residence with the nondebtor spouse as tenants by the
entirety. The house was the debtor’s only property available
for payment of creditors and the trustee sought permission
to sell the property to pay joint creditors of the debtor and
nondebtor spouse. The trustee argued that the sale was
allowed under Section 363(h) because without the sale no
funds would be available to pay creditors. The debtor
argued that the nondebtor spouse, who was elderly, would
suffer emotional and psychological harm from the sale and
forced move. The court held that the sale would be allowed
because the debtor provided evidence of only possible harm
to the nondebtor spouse and the debtor would still have
substantial exempt funds for obtaining adequate new
housing. The court also noted that the debtor had not
attempted alternative methods of refinancing the house in
order to pay creditors and still keep the house. In re Harris,
155 B.R. 948 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1993).
WAGES. The debtor claimed the livestock raised and
crops grown as exempt personal service earnings.  No
timely objection was made to the exemption.  In a decision
on avoidance of a lien impairing the claimed exemption in
the livestock and crops, the Bankruptcy Court denied the
exemption as having no statutory basis.  The exemption
issue was certified to the Wyoming Supreme Court which
held that the claimed exemption was not allowable.  The
appellate court held that the exemption was allowed because
no timely objection was made.  In re Coones, 996 F.2d 250
(10th Cir. 1993), on rem. from, 113 S. Ct. 31 (1992), rev’g,
954 F.2d 596 (10th Cir. 1992).
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
Chapter 12 has been extended through October 1,
1998. The legislation also amends Section 1221 to allow
extension of the time for filing a plan if “the need for an
extension is attributable to circumstances for which the
debtor should not justly be held accountable. Pub. L. No.
103-65, 107 Stat. 311 (1993).
AUTOMATIC STAY. The debtor filed for Chapter 12
three days before the commencement of a jury trial in which
a creditor had sued the debtor on a promissory note. The
creditor immediately sought relief from the automatic stay
so that the state court case could proceed. The court held
that (1) the debtor was a necessary party to the state action,
(2) allowing the state action to proceed would not jeopardize
the bankruptcy case and would assist the debtor in
formulating a plan, and (3) the case would not be removed
to the Bankruptcy Court because the state action was ready
for trial and the delay caused by removal would prejudice
the creditor and other parties. In re Fay, 155 B.R. 1009
(Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1993).
ELIGIBILITY.  The debtor was a family farm
partnership which had a nonrecourse loan in excess of $1.5
million from a bank. The loan was secured by partnership
property, but the partners were not personally liable for the
loan. The court held that the nonrecourse note was included
in the amount of the partnership debt, thus making the
partnership ineligible for Chapter 12 because the total debts
exceeded $1.5 million. Matter of Lindsey, Stephenson &
Lindsey, 995 F.2d 626 (5th Cir. 1993).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
DISCHARGE. The debtor was found to have evaded
the collection of taxes by the IRS after assessment. The IRS
sought to have the taxes declared nondischargeable under
Section 523(a)(1)(C) because the debtor attempted to “evade
or defeat” the taxes. The debtor argued that Section
523(a)(1)(C) applied only to evasion of the assessment of
taxes and not the collection of the taxes. The court held that
the taxes were nondischargeable because the debtor’s
interpretation of Section 523 would provide a loophole for
dishonest debtors not intended by Congress. Matter of
Fridrich, 156 B.R. 41 (D. Neb. 1993).
CONTRACTS
AMBIGUITY. The plaintiff wanted to purchase a farm
on which the defendant was a tenant.  Because the plaintiff
wanted possession of the farm before the tenant’s lease
expired, the plaintiff obtained an oral agreement from the
defendant to release the land to the plaintiff after “harvest”
of rye grass growing on 80 acres of the farm. The plaintiff
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agreed to pay the rent on the remaining portion of the lease.
Because the defendant was growing a licensed brand of rye
grass and was contractually required to destroy the rootstock
before releasing the land to anyone not licensed to grow the
ryegrass, the defendant disced the field after harvesting the
rye grass seed. The plaintiff sued the defendant for trespass,
breach of the release agreement and breach of the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing because the defendant disced
the land after “harvest.” The trial court granted the
defendant summary judgment, ruling that the term “harvest”
referred to the time in which the release was to be granted
and not the condition of the land. The appellate court
reversed, holding that the term “harvest” was ambiguous
and that a trial was required to discover the intent of the
parties to the contract. Hauge v. Vanderhave, 854 P.2d
1002 (Or. Ct. App. 1993).
BREACH OF WARRANTY . The defendant orally
agreed to sell the plaintiff some spring wheat. The plaintiff
accepted a load of wheat from the defendant, cleaned it and
resold the wheat as seed.  However, the wheat delivered by
the defendant was winter wheat which was unsuitable for
seed and the buyers of the seed sued the plaintiff for lost
crops. The plaintiff sought recovery from the defendant for
its losses, including payments to the seed buyers. The
appellate court upheld the trial court ruling that the
defendant had breached the contract and was liable for the
difference in value of the spring wheat contracted for and
the winter wheat actually delivered. The remaining issue
was the trial court’s award of consequential damages, the
plaintiff’s payments to the seed buyers for the lost crops,
with the plaintiff held to be 49 percent responsible and the
defendant 51 percent responsible for those damages. The
appellate court held that the defendant would be liable for
consequential damages only if the defendant knew or should
have known that the plaintiff intended to sell the wheat for
seed. Because the trial court’s finding were inconsistent on
this point, the case was remanded for clarification on this
point. The appellate court upheld the apportionment of fault
because the plaintiff failed to test the wheat for germination.
Dakota Grain Co., Inc. v. Ehrmantrout, 502 N.W.2d 234
(N.D. 1993).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
BORROWER’S RIGHTS-ALM § 11.01[2].*  The
defendant borrowed money from the FmHA and defaulted
on the loan. When the FmHA brought foreclosure
proceedings pursuant to the farm mortgage, the defendant
sought a ruling that the Wisconsin one-year redemption
period applied and that the FmHA would be required, under
Wisconsin law, to sell the homestead separately. The court
held that under United States v. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S.
715 (1979), the FmHA was not subject to state law in the
foreclosure of the mortgage. United States v. Einum, 821
F. Supp. 1283 (W.D. Wis. 1992), aff’d, 992 F.2d 761 (7th
Cir. 1993).
The debtors had granted the FmHA a mortgage on their
farm and security interests in their farm equipment,
livestock and crops. After the debtors defaulted on the loans,
the FmHA sent to the debtors the Notification of Offer to
Restructure Debt. Because of the debtors’ divorce, the
FmHA failed to properly give the debtors further notices
and a decision to deny loan servicing benefits was
overturned on administrative appeal. A second restructuring
process was started, ending with a denial of restructuring
and a notice to accelerate the loans. The debtors failed to
timely appeal this decision and the FmHA terminated the
debtors’ appeal rights. The debtors argued that because the
FmHA continued to send correspondence concerning the
loan servicing after the period for appeal had expired, the
FmHA should be required to allow an untimely appeal. The
court held that the FmHA had given the debtors sufficient
notice of the appeal rights, including an extra 10 days to file
reasons for extending the appeal period; therefore, the
debtors’ right to appeal had expired. The court also noted
that the debtors had little chance of successful restructuring
of their debts and that the appeal would be futile. United
States v. Kottcamp, 823 F. Supp. 609 (N.D. Ind. 1993).
BRUCELLOSIS. The APHIS has adopted as final the
adding of New Jersey to the list of brucellosis-free states. 58
Fed. Reg. 43068 (Aug. 13, 1993).
DISASTER ASSISTANCE-ALM § 10.03[4].*  The
plaintiff applied for payments under the Disaster Assistance
Act of 1989 for losses to their cucumber crop. The ASCS
determined that the plaintiffs were one “person” with their
wholly-owned corporation which operated a farm
implement business. Because the total gross revenues of the
plaintiffs’ farm and corporation exceeded $2 million, the
ASCS denied the plaintiffs’ application for disaster
assistance. The plaintiffs argued that because the
corporation was not involved in the farming operation, the
revenues of the corporation should not be considered in the
plaintiffs’ gross revenues. The court held that it found no
requirement that the entities included in the “person”
limitation be actively involved in the farming operation. The
plaintiffs also argued that the “gross revenue” limitation
should be defined as net profits and not gross receipts. The
court held that the plaintiffs provided no support for this
argument and pointed to the legislation which allowed the
Secretary of Agriculture to define the term by regulations.
Haubein Farms, Inc. v. Dept. of Agric., 824 F. Supp. 239
(D. D.C. 1993).
The Disaster Assistance Act has been extended through
1993, with 100 percent payment of claims, subject to a
$100,000 per person limit.
FARM LOANS. The FmHA has issued interim
regulations amending the farm tract appraisal regulations,
primarily renumbering the current regulations and
incorporating Sections I and II of the Uniform Standards of
Professional Appraisal Practice. 58 Fed. Reg. 44749 (Aug.
25, 1993).
The FmHA has issued interim regulations extending the
time to five years that an applicant may be eligible for direct
and guaranteed farm operating, farm ownership and soil and
water loans. 58 Fed. Reg. 44745 (Aug. 25, 1993).
FARMER-OWNED RESERVE. The CCC has issued
interim regulations under the farmer-owned reserve (FOR)
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regulations offering producers an additional opportunity to
declare intentions for the 1992 feed grains FOR program
and allowing extensions of maturing 1990 FOR wheat loans
and 1992 wheat and feed grain loans. 58 Fed. Reg. 45039
(Aug. 26, 1993).
GRAZING FEES. The Forest Service has announced
proposed regulations (1) to improve administration of
permits, (2) to place greater emphasis on stewardship of the
rangeland resources, (3) to manage the rangeland resources
using an ecological approach, (4) to change the system used
to determine the fees for grazing of privately owned
livestock on national forests and grasslands in the west, and
(5) to achieve greater consistency between the grazing
management regulations of the Forest Service and the
Bureau of Land Management. The annual fee for grazing
livestock is scheduled to increase from $1.86 in 1993 to
$2.56 in 1994, $3.26 in 1995, and $3.96 in 1996.  58 Fed.
Reg. 43202 (Aug. 13, 1993).
MEAT AND POULTRY INSPECTION. The FSIS
has announced a decrease from $38,300 to $37,800 in the
amount of meat and poultry products which may be sold by
retail stores to non-household consumers (e.g., hotels and
restaurants) exempt from inspection. 58 Fed. Reg. 44158
(Aug. 19, 1993).
The FSIS has issued proposed regulations providing
standard criteria by which FSIS inspectors will determine
whether a bovine animal or carcass is properly identified as
a calf or calf carcass. 58 Fed. Reg. 45296 (Aug. 27, 1993).
PESTICIDES-ALM § 2.04.* The EPA has issued a
policy statement of the process whereby the EPA will make
interim determinations of adequacy of state compliance of
state pesticide applicator certification programs. 58 Fed.
Reg. 43994 (Aug. 18, 1993).
TUBERCULOSIS. The APHIS has issued proposed
regulations adding a definition, “accredited-free
(suspended),” for states whose accredited-free status has
been suspended due to detection of tuberculosis in any cattle
or bison in the state and adding requirements for moving
cattle and bison from states whose accredited-free status has
been suspended. 58 Fed. Reg. 43086 (Aug. 13, 1993).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[4].* The
decedent’s will left to an employee a monthly stipend from
a trust and use of the decedent’s residence, including funds
for the maintenance of the house. The provision for
maintenance of the house included funds for improvements.
The will also provided for payments from the trust corpus
for the employee’s medical bills and state and federal
income taxes. The will was originally executed in 1971 with
codicils executed in 1972, 1977 and 1982. The estate
executor obtained a state probate court order reforming the
trust to provide the employee with a fixed annual annuity.
The remainder of the trust passed to a charitable
organization. The IRS denied the estate a charitable
deduction for the remainder interest, arguing that because
the will was changed after 1979, the reformation of the trust
was not allowed to qualify the trust remainder interest for
the charitable deduction. The court held that because the
1982 codicil made only minor changes in the original will
and stated that it “republished” the original will, the will
was considered executed prior to 1979. The IRS also argued
that because funds from the income of the trust could be
expended for house improvements and the employees
medical and tax bills, the remainder interest was not
ascertainable. The court held that the value of the remainder
interest was ascertainable because the improvements would
be limited to the maintenance of the house and the power to
invade trust corpus for medical and tax costs was subject to
a sufficiently objective standard. Wells Fargo Bank v. U.S.,
93-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,144 (9th Cir. 1993), aff’g,
91-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,067 (C.D. Cal. 1991).
CLAIMS AGAINST ESTATE-ALM § 5.04[1].*  The
decedent made several gifts of money to the decedent's
children who transferred the money back to the decedent in
exchange for a non-interest bearing note payable in 25 years
or upon the death of the decedent.  The decedent reported
the gifts on federal gift tax returns.  The court held that the
estate could not deduct the notes as claims against the estate
because the notes did not represent bona fide debts
contracted for full and adequate consideration.  Est. of
Flandreau v. Comm'r, 994 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1993), aff’g,
T.C. Memo. 1992-173.
SPECIAL USE VALUATION-ALM § 5.03[2].* The
decedent died in 1981 and the taxpayer received a bequest
of farm land for which special use valuation was elected.
The taxpayer either directly farmed the land or leased part
of the land on a crop share lease such that the material
participation requirements were met. Part of the land was
subject to a mortgage on which the taxpayer defaulted. The
mortgagee foreclosed on the mortgage and the period of
redemption expired; however, the taxpayer exercised a
statutory right of first refusal and repurchased the land. The
taxpayer had continuous possession of the land during the
foreclosure period. The IRS ruled that under Minnesota law,
foreclosure of a mortgage on farm land did not transfer all
of the owner’s interest in the land until the right of first
refusal was extinguished; therefore, the taxpayer had
sufficient interest in the farm land throughout the period
when the mortgage was foreclosed to prevent recapture of
special use valuation benefits. The IRS also ruled that the
foreclosure of the mortgage was not an involuntary transfer
for purposes of I.R.C. § 1033 because the “seizure” of the
property was not a public condemnation. The IRS cited
Recio v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1991-215. Ltr. Rul.
9333002, April 20, 1993.
TRUSTS-ALM Ch. 8.*   When the taxpayers divorced,
they established a trust for their child with both taxpayers as
trustees. The trust provided for separate sub-accounts in
which each taxpayer’s contributions were placed. The trust
income was to be added to principal and the trustees had the
power to distribute trust property to the child for educational
and medical expenses, with each distribution coming
equally from each sub-account. When the child reached age
35 or died before reaching age 35, each account in the trust
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reverted back to the taxpayers. Both taxpayers had a
testamentary power of appointment over their sub-accounts
and could amend or revoke the trust by consent of both
taxpayers. The IRS ruled that (1) each taxpayer was the
owner for federal tax purposes of their own sub-account, (2)
each sub-account was includible in each taxpayer’s gross
estate, and (3) the transfers to the trust were not completed
gifts until trust amounts are actually distributed to the
beneficiary. Ltr. Rul. 9333028, May 21, 1993.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
ACCOUNTING METHOD. The IRS has announced
proposed regulations describing the the events which trigger
the recapture of LIFO benefits under I.R.C. § 1363(d) when
a C corporation elects to become an S corporation or to
merge with an S corporation in a tax-free reorganization. 58
Fed. Reg. 43827 (Aug. 18, 1993), adding Prop. Treas.
Reg. § 1.1363-2.
FARM CREDIT SYSTEM .-ALM § 4.03[12].* The
taxpayer was a direct lender bank in the Farm Credit System
and was required to purchase stock in an FCA bank. The
stock purchase funds were placed in a trust fund for
protection against defaults by banks in the system. The
stock purchase did not give the taxpayer any right to
dividends or liquidation rights and the stock could not be
sold to third parties. The IRS ruled that the cost of the stock
purchase was not a capital expense but was currently
deductible as an ordinary and necessary business expense
under I.R.C. § 162. Ltr. Rul. 9333005, May 7, 1993.
DROUGHT SALES OF LIVESTOCK.-ALM §
4.02[5].* Due to drought conditions in 1991, the taxpayer
sold more cows than would be sold in a normal year. The
taxpayer elected to defer the income from the drought
induced sales under I.R.C. § 451(e). In 1992, the taxpayer
purchased replacement calves and sought a revocation of the
Section 451(e) election and an extension of time to defer
income and replace the sold cattle in accordance with I.R.C.
§ 1033(e). The IRS ruled that the Section 451(e) election
could be revoked; however, because the 1991 tax return had
been filed, the ruling on the taxpayer’s eligibility for
involuntary conversion treatment of the cattle and
replacement calves had to be made by the District Director.
Ltr. Rul. 9332032, May 17, 1993.
HOBBY LOSSES.-ALM § 4.05[1].*  Business loss
deductions were disallowed for a horse breeding activity
operated by a production manager at a manufacturing
company where the expenses were consistent with operation
of the business only for personal pleasure. Rohr v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1993-373.
Although the taxpayers had eight years of losses from
their horse breeding, training and sales activities, the court
allowed deduction for the losses because an intent to make a
profit was demonstrated by the expertise of the taxpayers,
the amount of time spent on the business, the accurate
records and the expectation that the assets would appreciate.
Holbrook v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1993-383.
INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT.-ALM § 4.04.*  The
taxpayers moved several 40 year old houses to a historic
office subdivision and rehabilitated them, retaining over 75
percent of the existing external walls.  The Tax Court held
that the taxpayers were not entitled to rehabilitation credit
for the houses because the houses were not rehabilitated in
their original locations. The appellate court reversed,
holding Treas. Reg. § 1.48-12(b)(5) invalid to the extent that
it denied the credit to buildings which have been moved.
Nalle v. Comm'r, 93-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,468
(5th Cir. 1993), rev’g, 99 T.C. 187 (1992).
PARTNERSHIPS.-ALM § 7.03.*
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUSTMENTS.  The taxpayer
was a joint venture which filed federal and state partnership
returns. The partnership had two general partners. One
partner was a Canadian corporation wholly owned by a
Delaware corporation. The Canadian corporation and its
Delaware owner possessed the partnership accounting and
tax records and filed the partnership tax returns. The other
partner, a Delaware corporation, had the largest interest in
the partnership profits but did not possess the partnership
records. The IRS ruled that the partnership could designate
the Canadian corporation as its tax matters partners. Ltr.
Rul. 9332027, May 17, 1993.
INTEREST DEDUCTION. The taxpayers were
members of several partnerships and S corporations and
owed income tax deficiencies and interest on several years
of taxes. In order to claim the interest as a deduction before
the effective date of the 1986 Tax Reform Act, the taxpayers
paid the tax deficiencies and interest on December 31, 1986
and claimed the interest as a business expense. The IRS
argued that the interest expense was a personal expense of
the taxpayers and allowed the deduction only to the extent it
did not exceed the taxpayers’ personal investment income.
The court held that because partnerships and S corporations
do not pay taxes but are pass-through entities, the interest
expense could not be business related but was a personal
liability of each member. True v. U.S., 93-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,461 (D. Wyo. 1993).
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES. The taxpayers
formed a limited liability company (LLC) under the Illinois
Limited Liability Company Act. The IRS ruled that the LLC
would be taxed as a partnership because (1) the LLC lacked
the corporate characteristic of continuity of life since the
state LLC law required the consent of all members to
continue the partnership after a terminating event and the
LLC agreement required the approval of at least two-thirds
of the members to continue the partnership, and (2) the LLC
lacked the corporate characteristic of transferability of
interests because the Act provided that if any other member
objected to the sale or assignment of a member’s interest in
the LLC, the transferee or assignee had no right to
participate in the management of the LLC and the
partnership agreement required the permission of the
executive committee for any assignment or sale of an
interest. Ltr. Rul. 9333032, May 24, 1993.
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PENSION PLANS. The IRS has issued revised
procedures governing the Voluntary Compliance Resolution
(VCR) program to expand the types of defects which can be
corrected under the program, to give additional guidance
concerning the specificity of VCR compliance statement
requests, to provide a standardized correction procedure for
certain defects, and to extend the last day of the VCR
program. Rev. Proc. 93-36, I.R.B. 1993-29, mod’g, Rev.
Proc. 92-89, 1992-2 C.B. 498.
The IRS has adopted as final regulations interpreting the
I.R.C. § 401(a)(4) requirement that contributions or benefits
provided under a tax-qualified retirement plan not
discriminate in favor of highly compensated employees.
T.D. 8485, Aug. 30, 1993.
LANDLORD AND TENANT
   FRUSTRATION OF COMMERCIAL PURPOSE. The
defendant leased from the plaintiff farm land, including a
lake and several ponds which the defendant planned to use
for a public recreational fishing farm. The lease provided
that the plaintiff did not warrant any of the real or personal
property included in the lease. The defendant was unable to
maintain sufficient water levels in the ponds because of a
leak in the lake and the unavailability of other clean water.
The defendant sought excuse from payment of the rent due
to frustration of commercial purpose in that the property
was no longer capable of supporting the defendant’s
intended use. The court held that the defendant had not
shown that the business use was impossible but that it was
only more costly and difficult to maintain and the problems
were foreseeable given the state of disrepair of the property
when the lease was entered into. Williams v. Whitehead,
854 S.W.2d 895 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).
MORTGAGES
PRIORITY. A ranch was sold for cash and a
promissory note secured by a deed of trust lien. The ranch
was resold a year later to the plaintiff for a promissory note
secured by a second deed of trust lien, with the plaintiff
assuming the first promissory note. The plaintiff sold the
ranch to a partnership which did not assume the first two
notes. The partnership gave the plaintiff a promissory note
for the ranch purchase price and a deed of trust lien.  The
partnership borrowed money from the defendant bank and
used the proceeds to pay off the first two notes, giving the
bank a deed of trust lien on the ranch. The bank sold the
ranch at a foreclosure sale and three months later the
plaintiff also sold the ranch at foreclosure and sued to
invalidate the bank’s sale as a foreclosure of a junior lien.
The court held that when the partnership paid off the first
two liens, the plaintiff's lien became the superior lien against
the ranch and the bank’s sale was invalid. O’Dell v. First
Nat’l Bank of Kerrville, 855 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. Ct. App.
1991).
PARTNERSHIPS
DEFINITION.-ALM § 7.03.* The parties had agreed to
raise purebred registered cattle together, with each party
contributing property and services to the business. The
parties were not married but lived together on the ranch. The
parties had some joint bank accounts and joint loans but also
had separate outside incomes and separate personal bank
accounts. The business did not file federal partnership
income tax returns and did not register the business as a
partnership with the Secretary of State, nor did the parties
identify their business as a partnership to third parties. The
parties commingled business funds with their own funds
haphazardly and had no agreement to share profits in any
specific manner. The court held that sufficient evidence
supported the trial court’s ruling that the parties did not
operate as a partnership. Tondu v. Akerley, 855 P.2d 116
(Mont. 1993).
PROPERTY
JOINT TENANCY. The plaintiff was an heir to the
decedent who owned cattle with another heir. The plaintiff
objected to the decedent’s estate’s final distribution because
the decedent’s interest in the cattle was not included in the
distribution. The other heir argued that the cattle were
owned in joint tenancy; therefore, the other heir took the
cattle by survivorship and the cattle were not included in the
testamentary bequests. The other heir claimed that the cattle
were owned in joint tenancy because the official brand
certificate listed the owners as the decedent “or” the other
heir, and under Mont. Code § 81-3-105, a certificate is
prima facie evidence of ownership by the persons whose
names are on the certificate. The court held that Mont. Code
§ 70-1-314 controlled the creation of joint tenancies in
property unless specifically changed by statute. Section 70-
1-314 required specific language declaring the creation of a
joint tenancy in order for a joint tenancy to exist. Because
the brand certificate did not contain specific language
creating a joint tenancy, the cattle were owned by the
decedent and other heir as tenants in common. Matter of
Est. of Shaw, 855 P.2d 105 (Mont. 1993).
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. In 1979, the FmHA
made several loans to a corporation and six individuals. The
loans were secured by a deed of trust and several parcels of
real property. The parties defaulted on the loans in 1980 and
15 months later, the FmHA accelerated all of the loans.  As
a result of other suits by other parties, the FmHA was
enjoined for 21 months from accelerating or foreclosing on
any of its loans. In 1989, the FmHA sought foreclosure
against the collateral and sold the property. When the
FmHA sought deficiency judgments against the individuals,
the debtors argued that the action was barred by the state six
year statute of limitations or the federal six year statute of
limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a). The court held that
the federal statute of limitations applied because the action
was for money damages and was founded on a contract. The
court also held that the accrual date of the foreclosure action
was the date of the default for the defaulted payments and
the date of the acceleration for the non-defaulted payments.
The court held that the limitations period was not tolled as
to the individuals by the bankruptcy proceeding of the
corporation.  Although the court did not specifically discuss
the issue, the ruling implies that the injunction against the
FmHA also did not toll the limitation period because the
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court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the action as
untimely. United States v. Dos Cabezas Corp., 995 F.2d
1486 (9th Cir. 1993).
AGRICULTURAL LAW PRESS
P.O. BOX 5444
MADISON, WI 53705-5444
148
VETERINARIANS
NEGLIGENCE.-ALM § 1.01[4].* The plaintiff owned
a horse which was boarded at a third party’s stables. The
third party hired the defendant veterinarian to perform
castration on several horses, including the plaintiff’s. The
plaintiff’s horse required special risky surgery which
eventually led to the horse’s death from an infection. The
plaintiff sued the defendant for malpractice but failed to
provide any expert testimony as to the standard of care for
veterinarians in the area. In a case of first impression
involving veterinarians in Montana, the court held that as in
other cases of professional negligence, expert testimony is
required to prove negligence in the performance of a
veterinarian’s work. The plaintiff argued that expert
testimony was not required because the defendant admitted
that the care was substandard. The court held that the
admission exception to the expert testimony requirement
was not applicable because the defendant also testified that
the procedures were properly applied. Zimmerman v.
Robertson, 854 P.2d 338 (Mont. 1993).
CITATION UPDATES
 Langlois v. U.S. 155 B.R. 818 (N.D. N.Y. 1993)
(automatic stay), see p. 111 supra.
The Agricultural Law Press announces
its newest publication with a special offer:
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an
ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who advise agricultural clients. The
book contains over 900 pages and an index.
As a special offer to commemorate the assumption of
the publication of the Manual by the Agricultural Law
Press, the Manual is offered to new subscribers at $115,
including at no extra charge updates published within
five months after purchase. Updates are published every
four months to keep the Manual current with the latest
developments. After the first free update, additional updates
will be billed at $35 each in 1993.
For your copy, send a check for $115 (WI residents add
$6.35 sales tax) to Agricultural Law Press, P.O. Box 5444,
Madison, WI 53705.
Satisfaction guaranteed. 30 day return privilege.
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